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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Dates matter in bankruptcy.  For creditors, none is more 
important than the “bar date,” a deadline set by the bankruptcy 
court for them to file claims against, or request payment from, 
the debtor.  Claims filed after the bar date without an 
acceptable excuse are usually discharged (meaning the 
creditor cannot pursue the claim further and the debtor is 
released from the liability).  The bar date interacts with the 
Chapter 11 plan of reorganization, which typically discharges 
claims occurring before the plan is confirmed (i.e., approved) 
by the bankruptcy court.   
 
But what if the claim arose after a plan was confirmed 
and before it goes into effect?  To our knowledge, no federal 
appellate court has directly addressed this issue.  We hold that 
sections 503 and 1141 of the Bankruptcy Code authorize 
bankruptcy courts to set and enforce bar dates for 
administrative expense claims, including claims arising after 
confirmation of a plan but before its effective date.  The holder 
of a post-confirmation administrative expense claim cannot 
choose to bypass the bankruptcy process, so if the claim is not 
timely filed by the bar date, it faces discharge like a pre-
confirmation claim.  Thus, we reverse the District Court’s 
decision that a claim for employment discrimination that arose 
after plan confirmation and was not filed by the applicable bar 
date could not be discharged.    
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A. The Westinghouse Chapter 11 Case   
 
Westinghouse Electric Company LLC (together with its 
debtor-affiliates, “Westinghouse” or the “Debtors”) operates a 
global nuclear power business.  In March 2017, following 
costly delays with several nuclear power projects, 
Westinghouse filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Southern 
District of New York (the “New York Bankruptcy Court” or 
“Bankruptcy Court”).  In re Westinghouse Elec. Co. LLC, No. 
17-10751-MEW, ECF No. 1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2017).  
Through the bankruptcy process, Westinghouse hoped to 
receive “judicial confirmation of a reorganization plan that 
[would] enable[] [it] to restructure its pre-bankruptcy debts, 
pay its creditors, and return to active operation as a viable 
enterprise, free from judicial control and creditor scrutiny.”  In 
re Great Am. Pyramid Joint Venture, 144 B.R. 780, 788 
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1992).  
 
Filing a bankruptcy petition has immediate 
consequences.  It “‘creates an estate’ that, with some 
exceptions, comprises ‘all legal or equitable interests of the 
[Debtors] in property as of the commencement of the case.’”  
City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 589 (2021) (quoting 
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)).  The petition also affects the 
classification and treatment of claims under the Bankruptcy 
Code.  Holders of prepetition claims1 not secured by collateral 
 
1 The Bankruptcy Code defines the term “claim” broadly to 
include the “right to payment” as well as the “right to an 
equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach 
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typically recover only a fraction of the claim amount.  On the 
other hand, postpetition “actual, necessary costs and expenses 
of preserving the estate” are treated as administrative expense 
claims entitled to priority under the Bankruptcy Code’s 
distribution scheme and paid in full under a Chapter 11 plan 
unless the claimant agrees to other treatment.  See 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 503(b)(1)(A), 507(a)(2), 1129(a)(9)(A); In re Energy 
Future Holdings Corp., 990 F.3d 728, 741 (3d Cir. 2021) 
(hereinafter “EFH Admin Expense Decision”). 
 
In June 2017, the New York Bankruptcy Court set a 
“General Bar Date” for September 1, 2017—the deadline by 
which creditors had to file proofs of claims for most 
prepetition claims.  As is typical in bankruptcy cases, the bar 
date for postpetition administrative expense claims is later 
than the general prepetition claims bar date because the estate 
continues to incur expenses throughout the bankruptcy.  
Westinghouse’s Chapter 11 plan of reorganization (the 
“Westinghouse Plan” or simply the “Plan”) contemplated a bar 
date for administrative expense claims of “the first Business 
Day that is 30 days following the [Plan’s effective date].”  
App. at 260, Plan § 1.3.  The Plan further provided, with its 
usual overlapping verbs, that “Holders of Administrative 
Expense Claims that . . . do not file and serve [a request for 
payment] by the Administrative Expense Claims Bar Date 
shall be forever barred, estopped, and enjoined from 
asserting such [] Claims against the Debtors, . . . or their 
property, and such [] Claims shall be deemed compromised, 
settled, and released as of the Effective Date.” App. at 275, 
Plan § 2.1.  The Plan also contained customary language 
 
gives rise to a right to payment.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(5); see In re 
Rodriguez, 629 F.3d 136, 138–39 (3d Cir. 2010).   
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discharging all claims as of the Effective Date.  App. at 
301–02, Plan §§ 11.1, 11.3.   
 
Westinghouse then proceeded with negotiating and 
confirming the Plan.  In February 2018, it informed creditors 
of various deadlines for filing objections to and voting on the 
Plan.  Following a hearing, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed 
the Plan on March 28, 2018 (the “Confirmation Date”), 
concluding that it satisfied all the requirements for 
confirmation in 11 U.S.C. § 1129. 
 
Although plans usually become effective shortly after 
confirmation, there can be a delay of months or longer in cases 
where, for example, the debtor must wait for regulators to 
approve the plan or investors to finalize financing.  See, e.g., 
In re Venoco LLC, 998 F.3d 94, 107 n.14 (3d Cir. 2021); In re 
Worldcom, Inc., 401 B.R. 637, 640 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
The effectiveness of the confirmed Westinghouse Plan was 
delayed pending the closing of an investment transaction, 
which in turn required approval from government agencies 
such as the Department of Energy.  As a result, it did not 
become effective until August 1, 2018 (the “Effective 
Date”). 
 
That day, all the property of the Debtors’ estates 
(subject to a few exceptions) vested in the reorganized 
Westinghouse, which began a fresh corporate life.  See App. 
at 281, Plan § 5.1.  See generally In re Montgomery Ward, 
LLC, 634 F.3d 732, 737 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting there are 
three entities in a successful Chapter 11, “the pre-
bankruptcy debtor, the estate, and the post-bankruptcy 
business” (quoting Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of Absolute 
Priority, 1991 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 9, 12 (1992)).  When 
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Westinghouse gave notice of the Effective Date, it also told 
creditors that, under the confirmed Plan, August 31, 2018 is 
the deadline for filing administrative expense claims (the 
“Administrative Claims Bar Date”).  App. at 558.  The 
notice emphasized that those who do not file a claim by then 
will see their claims “discharged as of the Effective Date.”  
Id.  All this was blessed by the New York Bankruptcy Court.  
App. at 250–51, Confirmation Order ¶ 47.     
 
B. Ellis and the Pennsylvania District Court 
Case   
 
 Timothy Ellis worked for Westinghouse from 2010 
until 2018, most recently as Vice President, Global Projects 
Management Operations.  See Ellis v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 
No. 2:18-cv-01442, 2020 WL 4499931, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 
5, 2020) (hereinafter “Dist. Ct. Op.”).  On May 31, 2018, 
about two months after the New York Bankruptcy Court 
confirmed the Plan, Westinghouse terminated Ellis’s 
employment, explaining that his department was being 
restructured.  However, Ellis, 67 years old at the time, 
believed he was unlawfully fired due to his age.  He 
immediately hired counsel, who represented him by filing 
a charge with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (the “EEOC”) in July 2018.  The parties agree 
that Ellis’s employment discrimination claim “arose” when he 
was terminated, so it is a claim after confirmation of the Plan 
but before its Effective Date.   
 
 During its bankruptcy case, Westinghouse served Ellis 
with three notices:  the first about the General Bar Date, the 
second about the Plan objection and voting deadlines, and the 
third about the Effective Date and the Administrative Claims 
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Bar Date.  Ellis acknowledges receiving the first two notices 
but does not admit receiving the third.  See Dist. Ct. Op. at *3–
4.  He never took any action in the New York Bankruptcy 
Court to assert his employment discrimination claim.   
 
Instead, in October 2018, Ellis filed suit in the Western 
District of Pennsylvania District Court against (the now 
reorganized) Westinghouse.  It was initially stayed pending 
Ellis’s exhaustion of state administrative remedies.  After the 
case resumed in July 2019, Westinghouse filed a motion for 
summary judgment, arguing that Ellis’s claim, as an 
administrative expense claim not timely filed by the 
Administrative Claims Bar Date, was discharged by the Plan 
and the order confirming it. 
 
The District Court denied Westinghouse’s motion and 
granted summary judgment in favor of Ellis as to the 
bankruptcy discharge issue.  It first concluded that Ellis 
received proper notice of the Administrative Claims Bar Date, 
in part because the Debtors’ claims and noticing agent 
affirmed that all three notices were sent to Ellis and none were 
returned as undeliverable.  Dist. Ct. Op. at *7.  However, the 
Court ultimately decided that Ellis’s claim was not discharged 
in the bankruptcy, concluding that § 503 of the Bankruptcy 
Code does not authorize the use of a bar date to discharge post-
confirmation administrative expense claims.  Id. at *13.  It 
further held that § 1141(d) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits 
the discharge of post-confirmation claims.  Id. at *19.  
 
 Recognizing the novel and complex legal questions 
involved, the District Court certified the following questions 




Where a plaintiff’s claim under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (and parallel 
provisions of state law) arises after the 
confirmation of an approved bankruptcy plan of 
reorganization, but prior to the effective date of 
the plan and the vesting of the bankruptcy estate 
as set forth and defined in such plan by order of 
the bankruptcy court: (1) is the plaintiff’s claim 
barred by the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 503 if the 
plaintiff did not file such employment 
discrimination claim as a claim for an 
administrative expense prior to the post-
confirmation administrative claim bar date under 
the plan; and/or (2) is such employment 
discrimination claim discharged by the 
provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1141, and/or under the 
principles of res judicata, if such claim was not 
filed in the bankruptcy court prior to the post-
confirmation effective and discharge dates set 
out in the plan? 
 
Dist. Ct. Op. at *19.  We agreed to hear the appeal.   
 
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, as Ellis asserts a claim under the 
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 
U.S.C. § 621 et seq.2  The District Court also had jurisdiction 
 
2 To the extent Ellis is still pursuing a state law claim under the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, the District Court had 
supplemental jurisdiction over it.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).    
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to decide whether Ellis’s claim was discharged in the New 
York Bankruptcy Court case.  See In re Apex Oil Co., 406 F.3d 
538, 543 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that a non-bankruptcy court 
“is fully competent to determine whether the [bankruptcy] plan 
and the injunction” barred certain claims); see also Whitehouse 
v. LaRoche, 277 F.3d 568, 576 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that 
bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction over whether a claim was discharged by 
bankruptcy).3   
 
We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  Our scope of review “is generally 
constrained to the questions certified for review by the district 
court, [though] we may consider any grounds justifying 
reversal.”  Morris v. Hoffa, 361 F.3d 177, 196 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(emphasis and quotation omitted).  Our standard of review is 
plenary, meaning we review anew the District Court’s 
summary judgment decisions, applying the same standard it 
must apply.  See Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 193 
(3d Cir. 2004).  To prevail, Westinghouse as the moving party 
must show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
 
3 A week after filing its summary judgment motion, 
Westinghouse also filed a parallel motion with the New York 
Bankruptcy Court seeking to enjoin Ellis from prosecuting his 
claim.  After he argued in the Pennsylvania District Court that 
the New York Bankruptcy Court motion was duplicative, 
Westinghouse agreed to continue that motion indefinitely.  See 
Dist. Ct. Op. at *2.  The District Court noted that, assuming the 
Bankruptcy Court maintained jurisdiction, Westinghouse 
could have withdrawn its motion for summary judgment and 
proceeded only in the latter Court.  Id. at n.2. 
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fact and [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(a).   
 
III.  ANALYSIS  
 
“The principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to 
grant a fresh start to the honest but unfortunate debtor.” 
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 
N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984) 
(“[T]he policy of Chapter 11 is to permit successful 
rehabilitation of debtors.”).  However, the debtor’s interest in 
a fresh start is not absolute, as the Bankruptcy Code tries to 
strike the “delicate balance between the competing interests of 
creditors pursuing their claims and debtors in obtaining a fresh 
start and finality.”  In re Bugarenko, 373 B.R. 394, 400 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 2007).  This case puts in play these two competing 
interests.   
 
Against this backdrop, we conclude as follows.  First, 
Ellis’s employment discrimination claim is an “actual and 
necessary” administrative expense claim under 
§ 503(b)(1)(A).  Second, § 503 authorizes bankruptcy courts to 
set and enforce bar dates for administrative expense claims.  
Third, that provision permits the discharge of post-
confirmation administrative expense claims not timely filed by 
the bar date.  Fourth, § 1141(d)(1)’s language regarding the 
discharge of pre-confirmation claims is a default rule that can 
be overridden by the plan and confirmation order.  Finally, 
various policy and practical concerns about the discharge of 
post-confirmation claims are overstated and ignore the 




A. A Postpetition Employment Discrimination 
Claim Is an Administrative Expense Claim.  
 
 For the Administrative Claims Bar Date to be invoked, 
Ellis’s claim must be an “Administrative Expense Claim” as 
defined by the Plan.  The Plan’s definition references § 503(b) 
of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides in relevant part that, 
“[a]fter notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed 
administrative expenses, . . . including the actual, necessary 
costs and expenses of preserving the estate.”  App. at 260, Plan 
§ 1.2; 11 U.S.C. § 503(b).  To qualify, the claimant must 
typically show there was a “[postpetition] transaction between 
the claimant and the estate” and the “expenses yielded a benefit 
to the estate.”  See EFH Admin Expense Decision, 990 F.3d at 
741 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Women 
First Healthcare, Inc., 332 B.R. 115, 121 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2005)).  On first glance, employment discrimination claims do 
not fit neatly into this definition. 
 
 However, we agree with the District Court’s suggestion 
that, per the Supreme Court’s decision in Reading Company v. 
Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968), postpetition employment 
discrimination claims are “actual and necessary” 
administrative expenses.  In Reading, a bankruptcy receiver’s 
negligence allegedly caused a fire that resulted in damage to a 
non-debtor third party, who then asserted an administrative 
expense claim against the estate.  Id. at 473–74.  The Court 
held that, under the predecessor to the Bankruptcy Code, the 
claim was for the “actual and necessary costs” of preserving 
the estate.  Id. at 475, 484–85.   
 
Like the tort claim in Reading, an employment 
discrimination claim is a “cost[] ordinarily incident to 
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operation of a business.”  Id. at 483.  Further, a federal 
employment law violation is often considered a statutory tort.  
See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (referring to Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 as creating a “statutory employment 
‘tort’”).  Indeed, at least two circuits have applied the Reading 
exception to employment discrimination claims.  See Sanchez 
v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 659 F.3d 671, 679 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(explaining that employment discrimination claims are 
administrative expenses because they come “out of the regular 
employment relationship between the debtor and its 
employee”); 4 In re Zilog, 450 F.3d 996, 999 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“Thus, under Reading and its progeny, [employment] 
discrimination claims that arise post-petition but pre-
 
4 In Sanchez, an employee with a postpetition, but pre-
confirmation, discrimination claim argued it was not 
discharged by the bar date.  659 F.3d at 674–75.  The Eighth 
Circuit ultimately sided with the employee, concluding his 
claim survived under the specific terms of the plan, which 
exempted from discharge any administrative expenses 
“incurred in the ordinary course of business.”  Id. at 678; see 
also In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 447 F.3d 461, 467 (6th 
Cir. 2006) (same).  Ellis does not raise a similar argument, so 
it is forfeited.  In any event, the argument would likely be 
unworkable here, as the language in the Westinghouse Plan 
and notices differ from those cases.  See Sanchez, 659 F.3d at 
676 (providing in the relevant notice that claims do not need to 




confirmation can be filed as administrative expenses against 
the debtor’s estate.”).5   
 
We recognize this result appears counterintuitive, as 
Westinghouse does not need to violate employment laws to 
operate.  To be sure, we do not mean to imply that employment 
discrimination is merely a cost of doing business.  But that “is 
the wrong prism to use in looking at the situation.”  Sanchez, 
659 F.3d at 679.  “Rather than focus on what went wrong, we 
must look at the utility of the underlying exercise.”  Id.  The 
employment discrimination claim arose out of Ellis’s 
employment, which without dispute benefitted the 
Westinghouse estate.  Treating such claims as administrative 
expenses furthers the policy goal of § 503(b)(1)(A)—providing 
incentives for employees to continue working for a bankrupt 
company.  Pa. Dep’t of Env’t Res. v. Tri-State Clinical Lab’ys, 
Inc., 178 F.3d 685, 690 (3d Cir. 1999).  Without the assurance 
that any valid employment discrimination claim would be paid 
in full, workers may leave based on fear that their rights will 
not be fully protected.   
 
We part, however, from the District Court’s suggestion 
that certain administrative expense claims may be categorized 
differently for the purposes of priority and discharge.  See Dist. 
Ct. Op. at *12; see also Sanchez, 659 F.3d at 678 (stating in a 
dictum that “Reading defines administrative expenses for the 
 
5 The Ninth Circuit in Zilog held that a postpetition (and 
arguably post-confirmation) employment discrimination claim 
cannot be discharged “without first allowing for the 
presentation of such claims.”  450 F.3d at 1001.  That is not the 
case for Ellis, who received notice of the filing deadline a 
month before the Administrative Claims Bar Date.   
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purposes of priority status under § 503, which differ from 
purposes of dischargeability.”). Under this view, a Reading-
type administrative expense claim that is entitled to priority 
could still be outside the reach of a bar date.  But this position 
finds no textual support in the Bankruptcy Code.  A claim is 
either an administrative expense claim or it is not; it cannot be 
a chameleon.  And as explained below, the importance of the 
bar date is even greater when the debtor’s administrative 
solvency is at stake.  As a practical matter, the District Court’s 
position that the claim is entitled to administrative priority, but 
not subject to discharge, is untenable, as that would allow 
creditors to cherry-pick whether they want to recover from the 
estate or the reorganized debtor.  Ellis’s claim is thus an 
administrative expense claim under § 503 and subject to the 
Administrative Claims Bar Date. 
 
B. Section 503 Allows Bankruptcy Courts to Set 
and Enforce Bar Dates for Administrative Expense Claims.    
 
At a high level, bar dates ensure that the promise of a 
fresh start is not illusory, as claims not filed and addressed in 
the bankruptcy cannot be asserted later against the reorganized 
debtor.  “[I]t not only allows the trustee or debtor-in-possession 
to estimate the debtor’s potential liabilities, it is also essential 
in formulating a viable reorganization plan. Without a final 
claims deadline, participants in the reorganization process 
would be hindered by undue caution in their negotiations and 
in voting on the plan.”  In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 
619 B.R. 99, 118 n.109 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020) (quoting In re 
Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 156 B.R. 928, 938 (Bankr. D.N.J. 




For prepetition claims, bankruptcy courts have the 
power to set bar dates “before which proofs of claim against 
the debtor’s estate must be filed.”  See In re Energy Future 
Holdings Corp., 949 F.3d 806, 811 (3d Cir. 2020) (hereinafter 
“EFH Bar Date Decision”); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
3003(c)(3).  In practice, they often set multiple bar dates to 
address the specific needs of the case.  See In re Lehman Bros. 
Holdings, Inc., 433 B.R. 113, 118–19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(discussing “custom-made features” in the Bar Date Order and 
different bar dates based on claim types).   
 
Claims not filed by the bar date are typically discharged, 
meaning the claimant cannot recover from the debtor or the 
reorganized debtor.  See EFH Bar Date Decision, 949 F.3d at 
811.  The bar date is binding on a creditor even if he does not 
participate in the bankruptcy.  See Tenn. Student Assistance 
Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 447 (2004) (“If a creditor chooses 
not to submit a proof of claim, once the debts are discharged, 
the creditor will be unable to collect . . . .”).  To avoid 
unnecessarily harsh results, a claimant can still file a claim 
after the bar date if he shows “excusable neglect.”  EFH Bar 
Date Decision, 949 F.3d at 814; see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
9006(b)(1).  Any discharge must also satisfy due process 
requirements.  See Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 346 
(3d Cir. 1995) (“Chemetron I”) (holding that “[i]nadequate 
notice is a defect which precludes discharge of a claim in 
bankruptcy”).   
 
The bankruptcy court’s power to set and enforce bar 
dates extends to postpetition administrative expense claims.  
Section 503(a) provides that “[a]n entity may timely file a 
request for payment of an administrative expense, or may 
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tardily file such request if permitted by the court for cause.”6  
This language “provides courts with the statutory authority to 
set and enforce administrative claim bar dates.”  4 Collier on 
Bankruptcy ¶ 503.02[2] (16th ed. 2021);7 see In re Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc., 447 F.3d 461, 465 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(explaining that the Bankruptcy Code “permit[s] the parties to 
establish a bar date by which time all administrative expenses 
must be asserted against the debtor or face discharge”); 
Sanchez, 659 F.3d at 677 (noting that an administrative 
expense claim bar date “force[s] creditors to comply with [it] 
or face a discharge”).8   
 
 
6 To be technical, a claimant files a “request for payment” 
rather than a “proof of claim” for an administrative expense 
claim.  4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 503.02[1] (16th ed. 2021).  
Still, much of the logic and case law about general bar dates 
for prepetition claims apply with equal force to administrative 
expense claims.  See id. ¶ 503.02[2] (explaining that courts 
have often relied on the “excusable neglect” standard to 
determine “whether to allow a tardily filed request for payment 
of an administrative expense”).   
 
7 A debtor can choose not to set an administrative expense 
claim bar date.  If no bar date is set, and depending on the terms 
of the plan, the claim could be filed any time against the debtor 
or the reorganized debtor, “limited only by the relevant statute 
of limitations.”  In re Worldcom, Inc., 401 B.R. 637, 647 n.13 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).   
 
8 One exception is that a governmental unit is not required to 
file a request for payment of an administrative tax expense.  11 
U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D); 4 Collier, supra ¶ 503.02[3].    
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Section 503 thus provides both a carrot and a stick for 
creditors promptly to request payment of administrative 
expenses.  File claims on time and, if valid, they will receive 
priority treatment in the bankruptcy and get paid in full under 
the plan.  File the claims late and they will face discharge.  The 
harsh result is justified because, like general claim bar dates for 
prepetition claims, bar dates for administrative expense claims 
help the debtors know their liabilities and implement a viable 
plan to obtain a fresh start.  Because the plan must pay 
administrative expense claims in full under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(a)(9)(A), unexpected administrative expenses can 
jeopardize the entire restructuring or become a significant 
burden to the reorganized debtor.9  Inability to pay 
administrative expenses is called “administrative insolvency,” 
typically resulting in conversion of the Chapter 11 case to 
Chapter 7 liquidation.   See 7 Collier, supra ¶ 1100.07[2] n.10; 
see, e.g., In re Constellation Enters. LLC, 587 B.R. 275, 279 
 
9 In a lengthy case, the bankruptcy court may set multiple 
administrative claims bar dates to help the debtor implement a 
workable plan.  See In re Chicago Newspaper Liquidation 
Corp., 490 B.R. 487, 491 n.4 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013).  Even 
here, where the Administrative Claims Bar Date was after the 
Effective Date, the bar date encourages claimants to file claims 
promptly and gives the reorganized Westinghouse comfort that 
it does not face significant unknown liabilities.  See In re CM 
Wind Down TopCo Inc., No. 17-13381-SCC Docket No. 1105, 
Hr’g Tr. 12:13–18 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2018) 
(Chapman, J.) (explaining that the bar date applies to post-
confirmation administrative expense claims because 
“sometimes [companies] want absolute certainty that on day 
[31] of the reorganized debtor’s life . . . they know what they’re 
dealing with”).   
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(D. Del. 2018). Putting all this together, bankruptcy courts 
have flexibility under § 503 to set and enforce bar dates for 
administrative expense claims that are subject to discharge if 
not timely filed.   
 
C.  Section 503 Authorizes the Discharge of Post-
Confirmation Administrative Expense Claims.   
 
So far we know that, were Ellis fired on March 27, 2018, 
(i.e., the day before the Confirmation Date), his claim would 
be subject to discharge if not filed by a reasonable bar date 
(e.g., 30 days after the Confirmation Date).  We next consider 
whether an administrative expense claim that arose between 
the plan’s confirmation and effective date is also bound by the 
bar date and subject to discharge.   
 
We begin with the text of the Bankruptcy Code.  See 
Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 883, 
893 (2018).  Nothing in § 503(a) says that only pre-
confirmation claims must be “timely filed.”  Ellis is essentially 
asking us to hold that a bankruptcy court can never set a bar 
date that applies to post-confirmation administrative expense 
claims.  Section 503 recognizes no such limitation, and we 
generally refrain from adding words to a statute.  See Hanover 
Bank v. C.I.R., 369 U.S. 672, 687 (1962) (explaining that 
courts cannot “add to or alter the words employed to effect a 
purpose which does not appear on the face of the statute”).    
 
In fact, when considering the broader “statutory 
structure,” see Merit Mgmt., 138 S. Ct. at 894, the only 
temporal limit is with the existence of the estate, not the date 
of plan confirmation.  Because administrative expenses 
preserve the bankruptcy “estate,” what matters is that the claim 
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accrues against the estate before it ceases to exist.   See 11 
U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A).  While typically the estate ends when 
the plan is confirmed, the plan can extend the life of the estate 
to a later date such as the effective date.  See Venoco, 998 F.3d 
at 107 n.14; Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Haw. Auto. Dealers’ Ass’n, 
997 F.2d 581, 588–89 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that where the 
plan “unambiguously provides for the continuation of the 
estate post-confirmation,” there can be allowed post-
confirmation administrative expense claims); see also 11 
U.S.C. § 1141(b).  Here the Plan provided that the estate’s 
property did not vest in the reorganized debtors until the 
Effective Date (August 1, 2018).  App. at 281, Plan, § 5.1.  The 
Westinghouse estate therefore continued to exist until that date, 
and any post-confirmation expenses qualify as administrative 
expense claims.  App. at 260, Plan § 1.2 (defining 
“Administrative Expense Claim” to include expenses 
“incurred on or after the Petition Date and through the Effective 
Date”) (emphasis added).     
 
The Bankruptcy Code thus ties the viability of 
administrative expense claims (and, by extension, the coverage 
of a bar date for those claims) to the existence of the estate, not 
confirmation of the plan.  Permitting the bankruptcy court to 
manage all claims against the estate is a logical result.  Where 
the gap between the confirmation date and effective date is 
significant, concerns about undisclosed liabilities are 
heightened, and the bar date becomes even more important.  A 
categorical carveout from the bar date for all post-confirmation 
claims would needlessly tie the hands of bankruptcy courts to 
use the bar date as a reorganization tool.  See 4 Collier, supra 
¶503.02[2] (explaining that § 503 allows “courts [to] exercise 
their discretion in setting bar dates according to the 




The District Court questioned whether authority for 
discharging an administrative expense claim can even be based 
on § 503, as it does not mention the word “discharge,” which 
is discussed in § 1141.  See Dist. Ct. Op. at *13.  In practice, 
the specter of discharge is integral to a bar date.  Without it, 
bar dates would have no teeth.  See 4 Collier, supra ¶ 503.02[2] 
(“[T]he effect of not permitting the ‘filing’ of a tardy request 
(except for cause) is that such expenses will not be approved 
for payment from the estate.”); see also Eagle-Picher, 447 F.3d 
at 465 (explaining the bar date is a deadline “by which all 
administrative expenses must be asserted against the debtor or 
face discharge”).10  We believe the better view is that §§ 503 
and 1141 work in tandem.  Section 503 gives bankruptcy courts 
the power to set and enforce bar dates.  And, as discussed 
below, § 1141(d) allows the plan and confirmation order 
generally to govern the discharge of claims (with a few 
exceptions). 
 
D.  Section 1141(d)(1) Does Not Prohibit the 
Discharge of Post-Confirmation Claims.   
 
Ellis argues, and the District Court agreed, that § 1141 
of the Bankruptcy Code bars the discharge of valid post-
 
10 The District Court suggests that the “face discharge” 
language means the authority for discharge does not stem from 
§ 503.  Dist. Ct. Op. at *13.  We disagree.  The more logical 
reading, and the way we use the phrase in this opinion, is that 
failing to file a claim by the bar date does not automatically 
discharge it, as a bankruptcy court can still accept a late filing 




confirmation claims in this case.  See Dist. Ct. Op. at *18–19.  
The relevant provision provides:     
 
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, 
in the plan, or in the order confirming the plan, 
the confirmation of a plan— 
(A) discharges the debtor from any debt that 
arose before the date of such confirmation, and 
any debt of a kind specified in section 502(g), 
502(h), or 502(i) of this title . . . ; and  
(B)  terminates all rights and interests of equity 
security holders and general partners provided 
for by the plan. 
 
11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (emphasis added).   
 
We disagree with the Court that this provision is a 
categorical rule.  Our reading is that § 1141(d)(1) creates a 
default rule for discharging pre-confirmation debts, meaning it 
applies only when the plan and confirmation order are silent on 
the issue.  Here the Plan provided for the discharge of post-
confirmation claims not timely filed by the Administrative 
Claims Bar Date.  This overrides the default rule in 
§ 1141(d)(1).   
 
Our holding tracks the text of the statute.  Placement of 
the “[e]xcept as otherwise provided” proviso at the beginning 
of subsection (d)(1) means the carveout applies to everything 
that follows.  Tellingly, Congress did not place the proviso 
after a specific phrase in the subsection to invoke the “rule of 
the last antecedent.”  See Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 
(2003) (explaining this principle of statutory interpretation 
under which “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily 
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be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it 
immediately follows”).   
 
Our reading is also consistent with the structure of 
§ 1141.  Elsewhere, the section preserves broad flexibility for 
a plan and confirmation order to override default rules.  As 
already previewed, § 1141(b) states the default rule that 
confirmation vests property of the estate in the debtor but 
allows the plan and confirmation order to delay vesting.  See 
Hillis Motors, 997 F.2d at 588–89.  An identical carveout is in 
§ 1141(c), which “states the general rule that property dealt 
with by the plan or the confirmation order is free and clear of 
all claims” after confirmation.  See 8 Collier, supra ¶ 1141.04.  
Further, Congress knew when not to include any carveout 
language, as is the case with various exceptions to discharge 
that bind the parties no matter what the plan or confirmation 
order says.  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(6); see also Jennings 
v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 844 (2018) (reasoning that 
express exceptions imply there are no other exceptions).    
 
The District Court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s dictum 
that § 1141(d)(1) might prohibit the discharge of post-
confirmation claims.  See Zilog, 450 F.3d at 1001 n.5 (“We are 
uncertain whether post-confirmation debts can in fact be 
discharged in bankruptcy.”).  The Court suggested that the 
“‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided’ clause . . . can be read in 
either of two ways.”  Id. (alteration in original).  First, the 
words might modify “any debt.”  Second, they might modify 
“‘before the date of such confirmation’ . . . [, so] even post-
confirmation debts could be discharged if that were provided 
for in the reorganization plan.”  Id.  The Court did not take a 
position but remarked it finds “the first alternative more 
plausible.”  Id.  For the reasons laid out above, we do not follow 
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this either-or choice and read the carveout phrase to apply to 
everything that follows in that subsection; a plan, or the order 
confirming it, can trump the discharge rule provided by 
subsection (d)(1).  For our case, that means the confirmed 
Westinghouse Plan governs which post-confirmation claims 
are subject to discharge.     
 
 We are also unpersuaded by the reliance of the District 
Court on Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992), which 
held that a Chapter 11 plan did not discharge tax liability 
assessed after the plan became effective.  Id. at 51, 58–59.  The 
Court remarked that “[e]ven if § 1141(a) binds creditors of the 
corporate and individual debtors with respect to claims that 
arose before confirmation, we do not see how it can bind the 
United States or any other creditor with respect to 
postconfirmation claims.”  Id. at 58 (emphasis added).  But 
Holywell is of little value for our analysis, as it dealt with 
claims against a post-bankruptcy liquidating trustee after the 
plan took effect and had nothing to do with a bar date for 
administrative expenses.  Id. at 51.  Moreover, it was 
discussing § 1141(a), and made no mention of the discharge 
provision in § 1141(d).  In any event, and as the District Court 
acknowledged, we have already clarified that Holywell does 
not mean bankruptcy plans can never bar post-confirmation 
liability.  In re Arctic Glacier Int’l, Inc., 901 F.3d 162, 167 (3d 
Cir. 2018).   
 
We also understand the import of our Arctic Glacier 
decision differently than the District Court.  That case was 
about the res judicata effect of a confirmed plan’s release 
provisions on investors who purchased shares after 
confirmation.  Id. at 165.  It never tried to address the entire 
scope of when post-confirmation liability can be discharged.  
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Id. at 167.  The issue here is narrower—whether a creditor is 
bound by an administrative claim bar date approved by the 
Bankruptcy Court.  The analysis is not the same, for the point 
of a bar date is to bind creditors who did not participate in the 
bankruptcy.  See Hood, 541 U.S. at 447 (“A bankruptcy court 
is able to provide the debtor a fresh start . . . despite the lack of 
participation of all of his creditors.”).   
 
To be clear, our holding today is limited to the 
enforceability of a bar date for administrative expense claims 
and does not otherwise interfere with Ellis’s rights to challenge 
a confirmed plan.  For example, Ellis could have objected after 
confirmation if the Plan’s treatment of his claims were 
controversial (for example, by delaying payment later than is 
reasonable or making payments in a form other than cash, 
rather than paying valid claims in full in cash on the Effective 
Date).  And, as he did in the District Court, Ellis could contest 
the adequacy of the notice he received and whether discharge 
of his claim violated due process, which are arguments 
routinely reviewed by courts post-confirmation.  See Jones v. 
Chemetron Corp., 212 F.3d 199, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(“Chemetron II”) (holding that the claim of a tort claimant who 
was not born as of the claims bar date was not discharged by 
the confirmation order); Zilog, 450 F.3d at 1001 n.5 (“[E]ven 
if the bankruptcy court had the power to discharge post-
confirmation claims, the court abused its discretion in 
discharging the . . . claims here.”); In re Pavlovich, 952 F.2d 
114, 119 (5th Cir. 1992) (allowing a bank to challenge the 
debtor’s post-confirmation actions).   
 
The upshot is that holders of post-confirmation, pre-
effective date administrative expense claims are bound by a bar 
date like other holders of claims against the estate, and thus 
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they cannot choose to bypass the bankruptcy process 
altogether.  Ellis may not litigate his underlying employment 
discrimination claim without filing a request for payment in the 
New York Bankruptcy Court.  And because he never filed such 
a request for payment, we reverse the District Court’s denial of 
Westinghouse’s motion for summary judgment.   
 
E. Policy and Practical Concerns About 
Discharging Post-Confirmation Claims Are Overstated.  
   
Our holding today is supported by the Bankruptcy Code 
and furthers its principal purpose of granting the debtor a fresh 
start.  See Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367.  As noted, bar dates are 
essential for a debtor to know and manage its liabilities.  In the 
few cases where a bankruptcy plan does not become effective 
for some time after confirmation, the debtor still needs comfort 
that holders of post-confirmation, pre-effective date 
administrative expense claims will not come out of the woods 
later to assert them against the reorganized debtor.  Without 
this assurance, payments to other creditors may need to be 
delayed for fears that higher priority claims could be lurking.  
In fact, barring the discharge of post-confirmation claims 
would exacerbate this problem: creditors would likely take a 
“wait-and-see” approach, as many would rather press their 
claims against a reorganized debtor with no judicial 
supervision.  This could saddle the reorganized debtor with 
significant and unexpected liabilities, hence hobbling from the 
start its prospects for a successful, long-term reorganization. 
 
Still, some may be concerned that our holding favors the 
debtor at the expense of creditors’ rights.  Those concerns fail 
to appreciate fully the creditor protections that still exist.  First, 
any discharge of a late-filed administrative expense claim must 
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comport with due process, so a claim is only subject to 
discharge if a creditor received adequate notice of the 
bankruptcy and had a fair opportunity to press his claim.  See 
Chemetron I, 72 F.3d at 346 (“Due process requires notice that 
is reasonably calculated to reach all interested parties, 
reasonably conveys all the required information, and permits a 
reasonable time for a response.” (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted)).  And to refresh, the bankruptcy 
court can still accept late filings “for cause.” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 503(a).  We therefore do not share the concern that discharge 
of post-confirmation debts could occur “without any notice of 
the discharge.” See In re Holly’s Inc., 172 B.R. 545, 561 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1994).11  
 
Second, the burden to comply with a bar date is low.  
Other Westinghouse creditors with post-confirmation 
administrative claims were able to file timely requests for 
payment.  Westinghouse’s Op. Br. at 14 (noting claims for 
charges of equipment rental and maintenance and services of 
software company after plan confirmation).  A creditor does 
not even have to know the amount or validity of the claim, for 
 
11 The District Court held that Ellis received adequate notice of 
the Administrative Expense Claim Bar Date and did not certify 
that part of its ruling for us to consider on appeal, so we do not 
reach the issue and take no position on it.  See Dist. Ct. Op. at 
*8–9.  Still, we reiterate that a key element of adequate notice 
is information about the types of claims subject to a bar date.  
As most claimants and attorneys will be unfamiliar with the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Reading, all parties would benefit 
if notices of administrative expense claim bar dates make clear 




he can easily file a “protective” claim putting the debtor on 
notice without conceding any issues.  See DPWN Holdings 
(USA), Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 3d 680, 691 
(E.D.N.Y. 2017).  Thus, contrary to the District Court’s view, 
complying with the bar date does not compress the statute of 
limitations available to Ellis outside of bankruptcy or deprive 
the EEOC of enough time to investigate his allegations.  See 
Dist. Ct. Op. at *14.   
 
Third, although holders of post-confirmation 
administrative expense claims had no opportunity to vote on or 
object to the plan before confirmation, their interests are well 
protected because the Bankruptcy Code requires any plan to 
pay valid administrative expense claims in full.  See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1129(a)(9)(A).  Indeed, administrative expense claims are 
usually considered unimpaired and not entitled to vote on the 
plan.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f); In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 
391 F.3d 190, 220–21 (3d Cir. 2004).  And as explained earlier, 
a post-confirmation administrative expense claimant still has 
various options to challenge the treatment of his claim after 
plan confirmation.     
 
Fourth, contrary to the District Court’s suggestion, our 
holding does have limiting principles.  See Dist. Ct. Op. at *14.  
To reiterate, administrative expense claims can only be against 
the bankruptcy “estate.”  So in this case the Administrative 
Claims Bar Date could not discharge claims arising after the 
Effective Date, when the estate’s property was vested in the 
reorganized debtors.  The Court speculated that the discharge 
timeframe could be pushed “for months or even years to a 
distant” effective date.  Id.  But that ignores the reality that a 
debtor usually wants to emerge from bankruptcy as soon as 
possible.  Putting aside the intangible reputational and 
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goodwill costs, the sheer size of professional expenses in a 
bankruptcy often overwhelms petition-date expectations.  See 
Arturo Bris, Alan Schwartz & Ivo Welch, Who Should Pay for 
Bankruptcy Costs?, 34 J. Legal Stud. 295, 296 n.1 (2005).   
 
Finally, Ellis’s argument that filing a claim 
compromises his right to a jury trial is not novel, as the issue 
exists for pre-confirmation claims as well.  Ellis’s Br. at 20; 
see Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S 42, 44–45 (1990) (per 
curiam) (holding “there is no Seventh Amendment right to a 
jury trial” in the claims-allowance process).  Without wading 
into the morass on this complex topic, we note that the 
consequences of filing a claim are not as straightforward as 
Ellis suggests.  See 1 Collier, supra ¶ 3.08; see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(e); In re Highcrest Mgmt. Co., 30 B.R. 776, 778–79 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (lifting the automatic stay to permit a 
jury trial to proceed in the district court).   
 
*    *    *    *    * 
 
 Each bankruptcy is unique.  While a reorganization plan 
typically becomes effective immediately after it is confirmed, 
in some cases there can be a significant delay.  The Bankruptcy 
Code recognizes this complexity.  Section 503 gives 
bankruptcy courts discretion to set and enforce bar dates by 
which creditors must file administrative expense claims.  And 
while § 1141(d) states a default rule that confirmation of a plan 
discharges pre-confirmation debts, it preserves flexibility for 
the plan and confirmation order to say otherwise.   
 
Here, Ellis’s post-confirmation, pre-effective-date, 
employment discrimination claim was an administrative 
expense claim subject to a bar date.  Because he never filed a 
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request for payment in the New York Bankruptcy Court, the 
claim was discharged in the bankruptcy unless he can convince 
that Court to accept a late filing.12  The result may be severe, 
but that is a price for a debtor’s fresh start.  Creditors still have 
significant protections, though choosing to avoid the 
bankruptcy process is typically not an option.  We thus reverse 
the District Court’s decision.     
 
12 Our decision does not prevent Ellis from filing a claim in 
the Bankruptcy Court and asking it to accept the late filing 
“for cause.”  11 U.S.C. § 503(a).   
